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It is not by mere chance that Virtue ... dwells 
in greatest proportions precisely upon that 
same span of soil where hogs thrive in greatest 
abundance. In Iowa, where people ... read the 
Bible in the bathtub, there is approximately a 
full litter of pigs ... for every single citizen. 
William Hedgepeth! 
Theological discussions can be abstract and hard to 
apply, but I do not want this one to be. The reason is 
that I want to convince you to adopt a specific stance 
toward food animals. The best way for me to do this is 
by telling you my story. 
I am a Mennonite, and we, typically, are rural folk. 
I do not know whether every other Christian sect or 
denomination has more farmers per capita than we do, 
but I would be surprised if Presbyterians or Catholics 
had a higher ratio. Mennonites aspire to live simply 
and peacefully, and those who farm try to farm in a 
way that returns to the land as much as we take out of 
the land. In Story County, Iowa, where I live, the 
simplest and most sustainable way to farm is called 
family farming, where you raise grains in summer and 
feed them to livestock in winter. You use the manure to 
supply nitrogen fertilizer to your pastures and fields, 
and you sell your pigs and cows at auction when they 
are fat. On family, or mixed, farms, the rearing and 
selling oflivestock is the raison d'etre of the operation, 
and the operation is, in the current jargon, sustainable, 
ecologically balanced, and consistent with principles 
of Christian stewardship. 
Three initial confessions. I am not a farmer; my 
theological convictions are informed as much by the 
Reformed tradition as by the Anabaptist; and I am not 
nearly as virtuous as William Hedgepeth's paean to hog-
surrounded Iowans would lead you to believe. I know 
something about the way mixed farms operate, and I 
know something about the way Mennonites think. I 
know, too, that Hedgepeth is right; there are eight times 
as many pigs in my state as people. But, contrary to 
what my mother thinks, I am not a moral virtuoso. 
Neither am I interested in defending received traditions 
about family farms, or sectarian theology, or the 
supposed angelic effects of boars and sows on people. 
I am interested in drawing on the wisdom invested in 
the practice of family farming and the reasoning of 
theologians and philosophers in order to answer this 
question: Is it in God's will to raise and eat pigs? 
In the conclusion to a book called Is There A Moral 
Obligation to Save the Family Farm?, I argued in 1987 
that mixed farms are the most politically viable 
institution for meeting obligations concerning food 
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production, rural economies, and future generations.2 
The burden of proof is on those who think we should 
get rid of family farms and replace them with large 
industrial farms. My brother-in-law read the book and 
then asked me what an ideal farm would look like. I 
had no answer, and not only because I did not know 
enough about the daily operation of farms. I did not 
know what to say about the practice of raising and 
slaughtering animals, the cornerstone of the family 
farm's economy. I was sure that factory farms were not 
the answer because it is clearly inhumane to confine 
four chickens to floorless cages and to keep anemic 
veal calves in narrow chutes.3 But the question for me 
went beyond "What constitutes humane care?" to "Is it 
right to raise and slaughter animals?" 
Several years after beginning to champion the 
virtues of family farms, and a few months after 
converting to the Mennonites, I became convinced by 
philosophical arguments that eating meat is morally 
wrong. This made for a dilemma. How can someone 
who loves family farms reject the central practice on 
which they are based? How can someone of my 
Anabaptist and Reformed theological proclivities reject 
the time-honored tradition of Christian stewardship in 
which the domestication and humane use of animals is 
not only permitted but encouraged? And yet, there I 
was, newly convinced that domestic animals had at least 
a primafacie right not to be killed and eaten at a young 
age, but without a clue as to how to square this belief 
with my theological and agricultural convictions. Did I 
mean to say that the actions of generations ofMennonite 
farmers in raising and slaughtering hogs were sinful? 
I. How I Became a Vegetarian 
I have told you that philosophical, not theological, 
arguments convinced me to abandon meat-eating. 
Abandoning it was not an easy thing to do because meat-
eating is not an abstract philosophical issue. You cannot 
just make up your mind to oppose meat-eating the way 
you might make up your mind to oppose apartheid. If 
you make up your mind on this subject, you cannot 
really defer acting on your resolution until the next 
faculty meeting. You have to decide, before your 
stomach growls-probably within the next four hours, 
whether you are going to act on your new belief. The 
concreteness of the issue was a barrier for me. 
I did not have a hard time deciding whether pigs 
experience pleasure and pain, or whether they have 
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emotions, desires, wishes, preferences, and a family life. 
All of this seemed evident to me from watching the 
pigs on my Uncle's farm. Reflecting on a pig's life will 
probably convince you, too. 
Consider: pigs are not, as common knowledge has it, 
dirty, dumb, or solitary, animals. If given a sufficient 
amount ofroom, pigs will invariably defecate in the same 
area, teach their young to keep away from this area, and 
establish the area at a considerable remove from the 
sleeping area. Contrary to popular belief, pigs prefer to 
wallow in clean water, not mud, and will not play with 
toys soiled by feces.4 Pigs are intelligent, affectionate, 
and social animals. The only thing they seem to love more 
than having their stomachs and ears rubbed is lying next 
to their neighbors after having run playfully in circles 
around them, squealing and barking all the while. 
What is it like to be a pig? No one can get inside a 
pig's mind, of course, but we can think carefully about 
how they appear. Here is William Hedgepeth's 
perspective on his day spent in a pig pasture: 
Idling hogs amble and squat. Some root. One 
sneezes. The sleeping hog beside me wags his 
ear a twitch or two and otherwise remains 
removed from the milieu. A Hampshire bites 
a Yorkshire's ear. A Poland China bites my 
foot. A white hog with a black face and black 
spot on his side executes a galloping gleeful 
leap into the vacant pond. A wandering rooter 
pussyfoots up the hill and sneezes right into 
the face of the one asleep, who responds 
merely with another quick ear-wag and 
continues his snooze (p. 125). 
'" A hog [taking a] siesta on the hilltop has 
just jumped up to bump an intruding rooter 
down the slope, somersaulting to the bottom 
with a tumbling eruption of high-pitched 
squeals. Most of the hogs are up now, 
moseying about, perfectly unhurried: gambol 
and squat awhile, browse in the dried mud, 
drift in bulky serenity among the stumps and 
stubble and birds, call a sudden halt to it all 
every so often to look up at a sound or nudge 
another in the loin. Probe, poke, trot, root. Ah, 
hogs! They have unquenchably inquiring 
minds, each with a vast capacity for sustained 
wonder. And such a beatific quality-a certain 
handsomeness, really (p. 128). 
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Aristotle believed each animal has a telos or purpose 
to which it is directed, a "that for the sake of which" it 
exists. If Hedgepeth is right, the telos of a hog is the 
will to root, to find his food at least three inches under-
ground, and to get his snout into every tractor tire, hole, 
and crevice within reach. Not forgetting sleeping and 
investigating and eating and mating and playing, rooting 
must be one thing for the sake of which God made hogs. 
The daily activities ofhogs clearly suggest that they 
possess desires, preferences, pleasures, pains, and social 
lives. You may also now have some idea of what the 
telos of this higher marnmal may be. The hog: Kingdom, 
Animalia; Phylum, Chordata; Class, Mammalia; Order, 
Artiodactyla; Family, Suidae; Genus, Sus; Species, Sus 
scrofa; Subspecies: S.s. scrofa (the Central European 
wild boar), S.s. leucomystax (Japanese wild boar), S.s. 
vittatus (Southeast Asian pig), and S.s. domestica 
(domestic). These are some of the facts about hogs, but 
facts alone, no matter how many, would never add up 
to the moral judgment that it is wrong to kill and eat 
Sus scrofa domestica. For that, we need a general moral 
principle or two. 
Here's one: It is wrong to deprive a being of its right 
to life. When I first started thinking seriously about the 
one and a quarter inch thick Iowa chops I so loved to 
barbecue, I thought I had to decide whether pigs had 
rights, and whether I was depriving them of that most 
basic right, the right to life, by paying other people to 
carve them up for me. I was impressed by arguments 
like Joel Feinberg's and Michael Tooley's that it is 
impossible for an entity to have a right to life unless 
that entity has interests in the sense of"able to have an 
interest in X."5 Clearly, it is in the pig's interest to be 
able to sleep, eat, and root. But this is a different, weaker, 
sense of "interest" than the one required. For there are 
things that have interests that cannot take an interest in 
anything. It is in a hay baler's interest to be kept full of 
baling twine, but the machine does not possess the 
conscious .awareness necessary to take an interest in 
seeing that it does not run out of twine in the middle of 
a row. Having things that are in its interest, and even 
having things that are good for it, does not make a hay 
baler a bearer of moral rights. The machine does not 
have the right to be well maintained 
In order to have moral rights, something must be 
conscious, capable oftaking an interest or able to have 
an interest in what is good for it. We are capable of 
taking an interest in food, freedom, and the future, and 
we each have a basic moral right to food, freedom, and 
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a future existence. Do pigs? According to R. G. Frey's 
analysis, an animal has to be able to possess concepts 
in order to have interests in the relevant sense, because 
without concepts the animal cannot represent its 
interests to itself. If the animal cannot represent its 
interests to itself, it cannot take an interest in anything. 
To have concepts, the animal must possess language, 
because that is the medium in which beings frame 
concepts. Here the argument reaches rock bottom, and 
I found myself asking, Do pigs possess language? 
We, I reasoned, surely "possess language," although 
I knew that talking about our mental life in this way 
committed me to a specific psychological paradigm, 
the paradigm philosophers call the belief and desire 
framework. To interpret ourselves in terms of beliefs 
and desires is not the only way to explain what goes on 
inside, but it is a powerful and well-developed way, 
and it coheres with the picture we typically use to think 
about ourselves. So I was prepared, and am still 
prepared, to accept the belief and desire schema. 
Humans have both beliefs and desires. We have 
already established that some higher marnmals-pigs-
have, at least, desires. When my Uncle's barrows and 
gilts lift the lids on their feeder bins, I see no simpler or 
more efficient way of interpreting their behavior tllan 
to say that they desire to eat. When Hedgepeth's piglets 
chase each other around the pasture, there is no better 
explanation than, the pigs want to play. The central 
question is not whether pigs have desires, but whether 
they have beliefs.Ifthey believe that there is food under 
the lid, or that by hiding behind the tire they will surprise 
their buddy, then they must possess language and 
concepts, because beliefs are made of language and 
concepts. If they have beliefs, they may be capable of 
taking an interest in their eating and playing. And if 
they can take an interest in those things, they may have 
a moral right to food, freedom, and a future. 
Frey is convinced, however, that animals do not have 
language because, he asserts, they are not capable of 
making assertions or lying. IfFrey is right that animals 
do not have language, then animals cannot have 
concepts, beliefs, or interests in the sense required for 
having moral rights. If animals cannot take an interest 
in their future, they cannot have a right to that future. It 
follows, according to Frey, that painless slaughter does 
not violate a pig's right to continued existence because 
pigs have no moral rights. 
This line of argument, if sound, would constitute a 
powerful philosophical justification for the historical 
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Mennonite practice of domesticating and eating pigs, 
and would buttress theological positions emphasizing 
ecological hannony and stewardship of nature. But do 
pigs lack language? They may not have the ability to 
make or entertain declarative sentences, Frey's way of 
interpreting what it means to be capable of language. 
But it seems to me that pigs communicate with each 
other, and they can, if they so desire, communicate with 
us in certain limited butdistinctive ways.6 Pigs, moreover, 
appear to many observers to reflect in a self-conscious 
way about their environment. Some, including me, think 
they have seen pigs trying to deceive each other. Pigs 
may indeed possess language, and may have the 
conceptual ability to take an interest in their future. But 
if they can take an interest in their future existence, 
they may have a moral right to that future. And if they 
do, our killing them violates their most basic right. 
If my factual claims about pigs' lives are correct, 
and if the moral principle, that it is wrong to deprive a 
being of its right to life is true, and if I have made no 
mistakes in reasoning to the conclusion, then it may be 
wrong to deprive a pig of its right to life. So I reasoned 
for several months. 
2. The Problem with Animal Rights Talk 
According to this line of reasoning, pigs have the 
right to life because they have beliefs and can take an 
interest in their future. But what about beings without 
beliefs who cannot take an interest in their future? What 
about fetuses, very young infants, and adults in 
irreversibly comatose states? Lacking beliefs, language, 
and the ability to take an interest in their future, so-
called marginal human beings also lack the equipment 
necessary to have a right to life. But do we really want 
to say that, that newborn babies do not have a right to 
life because, as Tooley puts it, they do not "possess any 
concept of a continuing self'? Tooley candidly, ifsanewhat 
coolly, admits this line of thought leads to the conclusion 
that it is not morally wrong to kill young infants. 
Any chain of reasoning ending with that conclu~ion 
must be mistaken. I began to see that trying to think 
about morality solely in terms of rights leads to 
counterintuitive results. And I was soon convinced that 
the consequences of thinking about which beings we 
may and may not justifiably kill solely in the language 
of individual rights is itself a reductio of such a narrow 
approach. As one philosopher has pointed out, "we have 
to take seriously the possibility... that some actions are 
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wrong for reasons other than that they violate rights."? 
And as another adds, "we may have duties to entities 
which don't have rights."g 
To think there is a single simple criterion according 
to which we may decide whether we are justified in 
killing a being is to think in excessively constricted 
terms. And to think that "the way is open" to killing 
any being that lacks moral rights is to think in terms of 
an unacceptable conceptual paradigm.9 I decided I had 
to rethink my approach, and fast. 
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There I was, converted to the view I should not eat 
higher mammals but no longer persuaded by the 
arguments that had brought me to that point. I wanted a 
more substantial and holistic grounding for my 
conclusions, so I returned to my teacher, James 
Gustafson, for his theocentric perspective. 
Gustafson argues that ethics as traditionally 
construed is excessively anthropocentric in that it 
concentrates only on what is good for the human 
species. Gustafson wants those in religious traditions, 
at least, to take into account the wider patterns of 
God's governance and care for all of Creation, and he 
urges his reader to search for rules cohering with the 
natural relations of all things. Adapting a command from 
Paul's letter to the Romans, Gustafson summarizes his 
approach this way: 
Be enlarged in your vision and affections, so 
that you might better discern what the divine 
governance enables and requires you to be and 
to do, what are your appropriate relations to 
God, indeed what are the appropriate relations 
of all things to God.I° 
If we relate to all things in ways that show respect 
for the relations of all things, will we eat meat? Let us 
agree to judge our practices by the criterion of whether 
a practice fits with the natural relationships of plants, 
animals, and humans, as these relationships can be 
discerned from the study of science, philosophy, and 
theology. Suppose, further, that "Man, the measurer, 
can no longer be the measure of the value of all things," 
and that, instead, "all things" are now the measure of 
us. May farmers continue to buy and sell feeder hogs? 
Gustafson himself seems to have little interest in 
this question, and offers no guidance. To figure out what 
124 Summer 1992 
Pigs and Piety: Theocentric Perspective on Food Animals 
a theocentric perspective on food animals might be, 
then, I turned to Scripture. You will not be surprised to 
learn that I found a thoroughly ambiguous answer. The 
Bible implies here that God wants lions and lambs to 
lie down together in peace; in the first chapter of Genesis 
we are told that God gave us only plants and fruits for 
food. ll Yet the Bible implies elsewhere, in passage after 
passage, that it is alright to be carnivores. After the Fall, 
God explicitly issues permission for us to eat animals. 
How can a Mennonite reconcile these biblical 
permissions to eat meat with moral vegetarianism? 
An Interlude: Christmas Meditation 
As I think about the Bible and animals toward the 
end of 1990, Christmas approaches, and I am reminded 
of my earliest memories of Christmas.. 
There is my mother's manger scene: the stable made 
of wood; the angel hung from the peak; baby Jesus 
wrapped in swaddling clothes and lying in the manger. 
There is Mary, hovering over the infant, attentive to his 
slightest movement, and there, a step behind her, is 
Joseph, the wise men, and the shepherds. 
I could end my description there, but I would have 
skipped the animals, of course. For there, behind the 
holy baby and the Virgin and in front of the shepherds, 
are the wise men's camels, looking gangly and out of 
place; the shepherds' dogs, asleep at their masters' feet; 
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the cow, chewing her cud; and the sheep, woolly and 
white. Over here is the donkey, shaggy and brown. 
Jesus Christ comes to earth in human form, and we 
witness and rejoice at his birth. But he was born not in 
one ofour houses, but in an animal shed. It is not insignif-
icant that animals witnessed and rejoiced at his birth. For 
God put animals around the manger just as God put them 
at the scene of every major event in salvation history. 
Think of the scene at the Garden of Eden. Before God 
made women and men and boys and girls, God made 
cows and donkeys and dogs and sheep. Think of God's 
first words to humans. When God first laid down the law 
for how we are to treat each other, God did not overlook 
our relations to animals, making a point of instructing us 
only to eat plants. Originally, we were vegetarians, and 
God did not want us to raise and slaughter animals. As 
the author of Genesis 1:29-30 puts it, 
God also said, "I give you all plants that bear seed 
everywhere on earth, and every tree bearing 
fruit which yields seed: they shall be yours for 
food. All green plants I give for food to the 
wild animals, to all the birds of heaven, and to 
all reptiles on earth, every living creature." 
And think of the scene at the future New Creation. 
The biblical story begins with humans as vegetarians, 
and it ends that way, too. When the Lord comes in power, 
when the poor are judged with justice and the knowledge 
of the Lord fills the land, then, we are told by Isaiah, 
the wolf shall live with the sheep, 
and the leopard lie down with the kid; 
and the calf and the young lion shall grow up 
together, 
and a little child shall lead them; 
and the cow and the bear shall be friends, 
and their young shall lie down together. 
One day, all animals will stop doing harm to each other, 
and "the lion shall eat straw like cattle."And if the 
"infant shall play over the hole of the cobra," what 
excuse will we have for killing cobras, or lions, orcattle? 
For on that day, no living thing will "hurt or destroy in 
all my holy mountain" (Isaiah 11:5-9). 
Or think of the stories Jesus liked to tell. If the 
number of times someone refers to lambs and sheep 
and goats and vipers and asses is any indication of their 
affection for animals, then our Lord must have loved 
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nonhumans as much as St. Francis ofAssisi loved them. 
Jesus' parables are full of animals. So, pick any major 
biblical scene, and you will find animals there. The 
menagerie at the manger scene is not a biblical anomaly. 
Why all the biblical concern with animals? Because, 
in the words of my mother's favorite hymn, God's eye 
is on the sparrow. In the very first covenant God makes 
with us after God has destroyed the world in the flood, 
God makes an agreement with Noah and his family that 
includes animals in it. The covenant is not, as we 
ordinarily think of it, between the Deity and humankind 
but, rather, between the Deity and all of creation, human 
and animals included. Genesis 9:13 renders it like this: 
My bow I set in the cloud, 
sign of the covenant 
between myself and the earth. 
And five times in the ninth chapter ofGenesis God promises 
never again to destroy creation; the promise includes 
humans, but it extends to "every living creature that is with 
you, all birds and cattle, all the wild animals with you on 
earth, all that have come out of tile ark" (Genesis 9:8-10). 
If the biblical story begins and ends with humans as 
vegetarians, why do most Christians, unlike Brahmins, 
adherents of the Jain religion, and many Buddhists, eat 
meat? The reason is that we believe God gave us 
permission to do so. When and where? At the same 
time God made the covenant with Noah. God tells Noah 
to "be fruitful and increase, swarm throughout the earth 
and rule over it" (Gen. 9:7), adding 
The fear and dread of you shall fall upon all 
wild animals on earth, on all birds of heaven, 
on everything that moves upon the ground and 
all fish in the sea; they are given into your 
hands. Every creature that lives and moves 
shall be food for you; I give you them all, as 
once I gave you all green plants (Gen. 9:2-3). 
This is the divine permission on which the nomadic 
and agrarian economies of the West are based. To me, 
the passage reads more as a grim prediction of what 
will happen or, perhaps, as an unavoidable curse God 
lays, grudgingly, on the world. It does not read to me as 
God's preferred norm. Be that as it may, there are plenty 
of other passages recording God's commands to 
sacrifice animals. The world's three major Western 
religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all condone 
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meat-eating, and all support economies founded on the 
domestication, slaughter, and consumption of animals. 
And yet, there by Jesus' crib, are the animals. Are 
they there only to serve us? Well, they do serve us, and 
some have said we have rigorous covenants to keep 
with them because they serve us. We have a covenant 
with the donkey, it is said: You carry the mother ofour 
Lord, and we will care for your every need. We have a 
covenant with the dog, it is said: You provide us 
companionship, and we will give you exercise. And we 
have a covenant with the horse, it is said: You pull our 
plow, and we will give you a warm stall and oats. We 
signed different terms with sheep, cows, turkeys, 
chicken, fish, and hogs: They serve us by dying for us 
at a premature age. For modem breeds of hogs, whose 
life expectancy might conservatively be put at ten years, 
the contract runs out at six months. Of course, we 
provide them with plenty of food and water while they 
are with us. But they pay, early, with their lives. 
Are these fair contracts? 
The Bible indisputably approves of them. The authors 
of Scripture recognize the intrinsic value of animals in 
the original and final creations but, in the meantime, in 
the between times, God seems to have made a concession 
to our sinful condition by relaxing the law against the 
eating of animal flesh. For hard after describing the 
Garden of Eden, the author of Genesis describes the 
post-Fallen world as one in which the animals are "meat 
for us," and in which we are to rule over, have dominion 
over, all forms of plant and animal life. 
What aboutJesus? Even though animals often serve 
as examples in his parables, he said nothing to our 
knowledge about vegetarianism. There are no recorded 
instances of him eating red meat in the New Testament, 
but it seems reasonable to suppose, given the 
Mediterranean culture of his time, that he ate fish. And 
he said nothing about restoring the original herbivorous 
condition of the original and final creation. So I must 
ask again: In the face of the strong biblical permission 
to raise and slaughter animals for food, can a Mennonite 
argue for moral vegetarianism if he takes the Bible and 
its tradition of interpretation seriously? 
This is a difficult question for me. My tentative 
answer has two parts. The first part is that vegetarianism 
is not required for all people at all times. When the eating 
of meat is the only way to sustain human life, then I 
believe it is permissible to do so. The Bible was written 
by largely nomadic or pastoral peoples who may not 
have been able to flourish withoul raising the flocks of 
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sheep that appear throughout the Bible. So, on the one 
hand, the Bible may originally have been addressed to 
an audience in which a limited diet of animal flesh was 
required for existence. Notice, however, what does not 
follow from this concession. It does not follow that 
affluent Americans in the 20th century may eat meat. 
We can easily have our need for protein met in ways 
other than eating pork chops and hamburgers. 
The second part of my reply to the Bible's explicit 
permission of meat-eating is this. While the Bible does 
address many sins, it does not address all sins. For 
example, the Bible does not explicitly call discrimi-
nation on the basis of age or sex a sin. Nor does it call 
slavery a sin. Jesus said nothing about the practice of 
buying and selling people with skins darker than ours. 
Are we to conclude that God would have us continue 
to own slaves, or that Jesus Christ, the Savior and 
Liberator of all people, would not disapprove of our 
beginning once more to conduct slave raids on poor 
developing countries? Even though the Bible says 
nothing that could be taken as a direct condemnation 
of slavery, slavery is still wrong. The reason is because 
the overall themes of the Bible are freedom, liberation, 
justice, and mercy. The nineteenth century American 
Methodists and Quakers who led the abolitionist 
movement knew this. Even though Christian slave 
owners in the nineteenth century could point to a 
multitude of specific biblical passages that implicitly 
permit slave-holding, the abolitionists had the stronger 
argument, and we now acknowledge their point of view 
as most in keeping with the whole biblical narrative. 
I have come to interpret the Bible's views on the 
killing of animals in the way I interpret its views on tile 
owning of slaves. Even though each practice is 
implicitly, if not explicitly, condoned, the practice is 
still shown to be wrong by the larger story of salvation 
in Jesus Christ. How could the biblical authors have 
been so wrong on this point of morality? I do not believe 
they were wrong on a point of morality. I believe they 
were wrong on point of fact. Regarding slave-holding, 
they were wrong to think that darker skinned humans 
were not conscious, rational individuals. Once this 
perception of the facts was corrected, darker skinned 
humans could no longer be thought to fall outside tile 
Bible's moral protection. 
Analogously, the biblical authors were wrong about 
mammals. They thought animals were not conscious, 
sentient individuals. Once this misperception is 
changed, nonhuman animals no longer fall outside tile 
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Bible's moral protection. To argue this point effectively 
would require me to say why I think animals are 
conscious and sentient beings. That involves the 
philosophical argument I made earlier that turns on the 
claim thatmammals aged one year and older have beliefs, 
desires, emotions, social and family lives, and interests 
in the strong sense of "able to take an interest in" 
something. Having that, they are entitled to basic moral 
rights, including the right to life. To my mind, Tom 
Regan makes this argument persuasively.12 
Just as early abolitionists had to fight both the wider 
slave society and the power of slave-owning Christians 
who rested their case on a selective reading of Scripture, 
so Christian defenders of animals must fight both the 
wider meat-eating society and the power of carnivorous 
Christians who rest their case on a selective reading of 
Scripture. No easy chore. I find encouragement in the 
scene around the manger. There we see a picture of 
creation in the peaceful coexistence God originally 
intended and fmally wants. Around the manger we see 
the truth of God's admission that God "desires steadfast 
love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than 
burnt offerings" (Hosea 6:6). And we see what it means 
for God to have shown us what is good. God shows us 
in the manger scene that what the Lord requires of us is 
"to do justice, and to love kindness and [to] walk humbly 
with [our] God" (Micah 6:8). 
Scripture gives an ambiguous answer to the animal 
question. As I mentioned previously, the text implies 
here that God wants lions and lambs to lie down 
together, while it states explicitly, elsewhere, tllat all 
animals are to be food for us. I concluded, in my joumey, 
that I could no more convince myself to be a vegetarian 
on the basis of the Bible alone than I could convince 
myself to be a vegetarian on the basis of rights talk alone. 
I did not find clearer advice when I tumed to otller 
religious traditions. Consider Hinduism, in which 
Brahmins revere all animals, practice vegetarianism, 
and adhere to the doctrine of ahimsa, noninjury. Like 
Albert Schweitzer and the Jains, Brahmins in principle 
will not even swat a gnat. Around the comer, however, 
lower castes behead a goat in pious sacrifice to the 
goddess Kali. Within Hinduism there is no consensus 
about tile propriety of universal abstention from meat. 
Consider Native American traditions, where you find 
ambiguous attitudes. There is an attitude of respect for 
tile buffalo's power and immensity, and warriors pause 
to pray to tile beast, imploring it to lend them its noble 
spirit. But then they proceed to slaughter it, eat it, and 
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wear its skin. Surely it is better to use all of the animal 
if you are going to kill it, but wouldn't it be still better 
to eatjustcom and beans and squash and to wear cotton? 
I have not, in short, found unambiguous guidance 
about how God would have us relate in a natural way 
to domestic pigs, from Gustafson, from Scripture, from 
Christian theology, or from the world's religions. Every 
argument that the Christian tradition should be read as 
sanctioning humane treatment and slaughter of food 
animals, may be met by one that the tradition should 
really be read as pointing proleptically toward 
vegetarianism. So, even if my theologian colleagues 
will not forgive me, they may at least understand why I 
turned back at this point to my philosophical colleagues. 
4. An Environmental Theory of Respect for Nature 
Gustafson insists that correct actions flow more from 
the possession of proper affections than from the 
following of proper rules. Paul Taylor believes that 
character is the heart of ethics, too, and I read his 
philosophical theory of respect for nature as a 
complement to, and development of, certain aspects of 
Gustafson's theology. Taylor makes the attitude of 
respect for nature the basis of all moral reflection about 
the environment, and identifies four dimensions of that 
attitude. Two of them are relevant here. The first is the 
valuational dimension, "the disposition to regard all 
wild living things in the Earth's natural ecosystems as 
possessing inherent worth."13 The second is the affective 
dimension, "the disposition.. .to feel pleased about any 
occurrence that is expected to maintain in existence the 
Earth's wild communities of life, their constituent 
species-populations, or their individual members."14 
Taylor believes we owe the attitude ofrespect toward 
wild living things. He avoids the language of animal 
rights, but he insists we follow the principles of 
proportionality and minimmn wrong. The frrst principle 
means that we should never act disproportionately, for 
example, violating an elephant's basic interest in life 
simply to satisfy our nonbasic interest in having ivory 
carvings on our mantlepiece. "Greater weight is to be 
given to basic than to nonbasic interests, no matter what 
species, human or other, the competing claims arise 
from. Nonbasic interests are prohibited from overriding 
basic interests."15 The second principle states that "the 
actions ofhurnans must be such that no alternative ways 
of achieving their ends would produce fewer wrongs to 
wild living things."16 From these two principles you 
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may see how protective Taylor is of wildlife. His attitude 
toward domestic animals is less than clear, however. 
The reason is that Taylor is impressed by the fact that 
pets and food animals have been purposefUlly bred to 
serve a human purpose. Unlike wild animals whose 
existence does not depend on their fulfilling our needs, 
domestic animals exist only because we have exercised 
dominance over them and their environment. Taylor 
puts the matter forcefully: 
[The practice ofrearing food animals depends, 
first,] on total hmnan dominance over nonhuman 
living things and their environment. Second, 
[it involves] treating nonhuman living things 
as means to hmnan ends ... The social institutions 
and practices of the bioculture are, frrst and 
foremost, exercises of absolute, unconditioned 
power. They are examples of the way humans 
"conquer" and "subdue" nature. (The conquest 
of nature has often been seen as a key to the 
progress of civilization.) When we humans 
create the bioculture and engage in its practices 
we enter upon a special relationship with 
animals and plants. We hold them completely 
within our power. They must serve us or be 
destroyed. For some practices their being 
killed by us is the very thing necessary to 
further our ends. Instances are slaughtering 
animals for food, cutting timber for lumber, 
and causing laboratory animals to die by giving 
them lethal dosages of toxic chemicals. I? 
Taylor does not explicitly draw the conclusion that it is 
morally permissible to continue to subdue nature in this 
way, but that conclusion is implied by his remarks. Other 
environmental philosophers, such as J. Baird Callicott 
and Mary Midgley, have a similarly bifurcated attitude 
toward animals.18 They think wild animals should be 
left alone whereas domestic animals should be treated 
hmnanely-that is, maintained in good health until they 
are to be killed painlessly. 
It began to look as if my tum to environmental 
philosophy and the theocentric perspective might cause 
me to overturn my decision against meat-eating. If there 
is an absolute difference between wild and domestic 
animals, and if this difference means that wild animals 
have intrinsic value while domestic animals have only 
instrumental value for humans, then it might be 
permissible to raise and slay hogs and yet impermissible 
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to kill wild wart hogs. To decide whether the difference 
between tamed and untamed was really this decisive, I 
had to read some animal science. Just how different are 
Minnesota Number Threes from wild boars? 
I immediately ran into a problem. To my knowledge, 
there are no scientific studies comparing the physical 
or behavioral traits of specific domestic pigs with wild 
pigS. 19 Nonetheless, on the basis of certain generali-
zations scientists have proffered in the literature on 
swine production, some observations about the 
difference can be offered tentatively.2o Feral swine tend 
to have aggressive dispositions. They often live in herds 
of four to twenty foraging animals consisting of one to 
four females and their young. Wild boars range freely 
in forest settings throughout the year, staying close to 
the herd during the reproductive season, when they 
become territorial and protective. Omnivorous and 
voracious eaters, sows and boars alike spend the 
majority of their waking hours walking, rooting, and 
eating. The courtship of an oestrus female by a wild 
boar lasts several days, with the male grunting a soft 
rhythmic mating song and having to overcome a last 
minute rebuttal from her when she wheels and faces 
him just before he tries to mount her. The wild sow 
may spend days making a nest for her young. The boar 
seems to enjoy the presence of piglets, tolerating them 
as they wiggle on top of him as he rests. 
Domestic swine tend to be larger, less fatty, more 
docile toward humans and less agonistic toward each 
other. As you might guess, we have little information 
about how large a "domestic herd" might be because 
pigs in confinement are not allowed to form natural 
social groups. Boars are kept away from the sows, feeder 
pigs are thrown together according to age, and sows 
are kept in maternity pens before parturition and during 
nursing. Even though they are usually denied the space 
and freedom to form natural relations with other pigs, 
domestic pigs are still known to adapt rapidly to new 
conditions. They exhibit a high degree of intelligence 
and have, for example, been trained to hunt truffles and 
indicate targets like Pointer dogs. 
The sexual relationships of confined pigs are 
noticeably different from their wild counterparts. When 
a sow in heat is presented to a boar, copulation occurs 
quickly. There is very little behavior corresponding to 
the long courtship of wild sows and boars, as domestic 
sows usually allow boars to mount immediately, and 
boars are selected, in part, for their virility and promis-
cuity. Boars kept away from sows sometimes form 
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stable homosexual relationships. Their behavior toward 
young piglets is hard to observe for reasons noted above. 
There are, in sum, significant differences between 
the physical, psychological, and social characteristics 
of domestic and wild pigs. Wild pigs tend to be smaller, 
fattier, more romantic, less promiscuous, and more 
ferocious. Domestic pigs tend to be larger, leaner, less 
romantic, eager to mate in season or out of season, and 
more docile. The differences stem from the influence 
of human intervention as farmers have consciously 
selected individual pigs for the traits now possessed by 
sows and boars. Breeders have weakened the pig's 
natural defenses, and rendered them dumber, less agile, 
and more meaty, than their wild relatives. Differences 
are undeniable. And yet we may ask, how great are the 
similarities? Are the differences significant enough to 
justify claims that we have exercised "absolute power" 
over the domestic animals? 
The differences in physical appearance of African 
bush pigs and Duroc hogs are noticeable, but both look 
more like the other than they look like other species. 
Both adapt quickly to changed environmental conditions. 
Both exhibit tremendous behavioral plasticity in the face 
of fluctuations in weather, diet, and physical threats. 
Both exhibit attitudes of defiance, pride, and affection. 
Both are extremely social. Both prefer not to leave the 
company of others, except for the case of older males, 
who sometimes prefer occasional solitude. Both like to 
root in soil and water, to wallow in pools. Both exhibit 
distinctive territorial behavior, keep separate areas for 
elimination of urine and feces, and train their young to 
do the same. Both are curious about new objects, and 
will sniff and nibble any protrusion or hole. Both have 
a complex range of vocal snorts and whoofs for 
communicating a variety of emotions, signals, and 
alarms. Both have nearly identical olfactory and 
auditory capacities. Neither is able to regulate body 
temperature for at least two days after birth. Neither is 
receptive to newcomers to the herd. Both are gregarious 
animals, huddling together against cold weather and 
enjoying warm weather in close proximity. 
The list could go on, but I have made the point. The 
differences between domestic and wild pigs pale in light 
of their similarities. May we then continue to believe 
that we have exercised "unconditioned" power over the 
being of the production hog? The scientific evidence 
fails to support the claim because the identity of the 
production hog is as much a product of natural forces 
as it is of human intervention. 
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May we at least claim responsibility for the 
distinctive features for which we have selected in our 
hogs? For example, domestic pigs are diurnal creatures, 
whereas wild pigs sleep during the day and are active 
at night. Is this trait a human mark stamped on the pig? 
It may be, just as the sexual promiscuity, docility, and 
physical size of the domestic hog may be marks of 
human intervention. Still, we must ask whether these 
traits are really of our doing or whether they are not 
responses that may be equally attributed to the hog. 
Consider that domestic hogs tend to be diurnal creatures 
whereas wild hogs tend to be nocturnal (hunting is easier 
in the evening hours.) Did humans cause this difference? 
I doubt it. Hogs are highly adaptable creatures, and there 
is not much stimulation in hog pens at night The 
domestic hog's preference for daylight activity may be 
a tribute to its own plasticity of behavior, a trait caused 
as much by the pig's own initiative as by the breeder's 
selections. Being diurnal, in short, may be a learned 
response to environmental conditions, and it may be a 
characteristic pigs would abandon if turned out of their 
pens or if stimulated at night This suggests that certain 
behavioral differences betWeen domestic and wild species 
may not only not be permanent but may be reversible.21 
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Based on a review of the empirical differences 
between undomesticated and domesticated hogs, 
Taylor's claim that we have created these animals seems 
weak, as does the implication that they are human 
artifacts we may regard the way we regard tools.22 There 
is no question that today's breeds are expressions of 
human power and control over nature, the result of 
invasive, repeated, and sustained manipulations ofgener-
ations of animals. The Durocs and Hampshires and 
Yorkshires now on Mennonite family farms would almost 
certainly not be here were it not for humans. Hogs are 
part of our moral community in a way wild animals 
never have been because their evolution is intricately 
connected with our own. They depend on us for their 
existence. But it does not follow that we are justified in 
continuing to intervene in their histories by encouraging 
them to inbreed, and by slaughtering their young. 
IfTaylor's views about food animals are not entirely 
clear, other environmental philosophers' views are clear. 
Midgley and Callicott seem to condone meat-eating as 
part of the long history of relations between humans 
and domesticated animals. The view gains credence in 
light of the fact that the history of a being is relevant to 
deciding what that being is and what our natural duties 
are toward it Consider Midgley's view. She approaches 
ethics from a biosocial perspective, and points out that 
we are members of nested communities, each of which 
has a different structure. According to our various roles 
in the various communities, we have various duties. 
The central community for many of us is an immediate 
family. We have duties not only to feed, clothe, and 
shelter our children, but to bestow affection on them. 
Bestowing similar affection on our neighbors' children 
is not similarly required of us, however. Not only is it 
not our duty, but "it would be considered anything from 
odd to criminal were [we} to behave [toward neighbor-
hood children the way we behave toward our own]." 
At the next level, we have "obligations to [our] 
neighbors which [we] do not have to less proximate 
fellow citizens"-to watch their houses while they are 
on vacation, for example, or to go to the grocery [or 
them when they are sick or disabled. We have 
obligations to those in our state which we do not have 
toward human beings in general, and we have 
"obligations to human beings in general which [we] do 
not have toward animals in general."23 
These subtly shaded social-moral relationships are 
complex and overlapping. Thinking of animals, 
Midgley argues that pet,> arc surrogate family members 
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and merit treatment not owed either to less intimately 
related animals, for example, to barnyard animals, or 
to less intimately related human. beings. Following 
Midgley's biosocial line of thinking, the narrative 
history of each animal defines its identity. Since hogs 
have been bred to playa certain role in our community, 
our duties toward them derive from understanding what 
their role naturally is. 
Like Midgley, Callicott argues that the welfare ethic 
of the mixed community enjoins us to leave wild or 
"willed" animals alone, while caring humanely for 
domestic species. This means that we are justified in 
using domestic animals in the ways they have been bred 
to be used. It is not inhumane to use a Belgian draft 
horse to pull a wagon, as long as you do not abuse her 
in the process. It is not inhumane to kill pigs and 
chickens and steers for food as long as you care for 
them in a way that does not violate the unspoken social 
contract we have evolved between human and beast.24 
Well, reading environmental philosophy made me 
wonder whetller my decision not to eat meat had been 
divorced from narratives, history, and common sense, 
in the worst way. If tlle history and social role of a being 
plays a decisive role in determining what that thing is, 
and if today's pigs would not be here if it were not for 
the long history of human intervention in the mating 
patterns of hogs, then the raising and slaughtering of 
pigs is the very practice necessary for Durocs, 
Hampshires, and Minnesota Number Twos to exist at 
all. Who was I to condemn these creatures? 
Callicott seemed to press the point on me. Those 
who condemn meat-eating thereby condemn tlle "very 
being" of the animals they are trying to defend. For 
without the long historical practice of meat-eating, 
Callicott writes, these particular animals would not 
exist. My moral vegetarianism weakened. 
Then I started thinking about the biosocial, 
environmentalist claims. Do we condemn the very 
being of something if we disapprove of the lifestyle 
that being is forced to lead? Surely not. To condemn 
the way something is treated is not to condemn that 
thing. When we condemn slavery we do not thereby 
condemn the existence of the slaves. Far from it. In the 
interest ofthe good of the slave, we condemn the social 
contract that has evolved to rationalize the restriction 
of their freedom. Analogously, I came to see that I 
could condemn the practice of domesticating and 
slaughtering pigs without thereby condemning the 
existence of these pigs. 
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Having answered Callicott's challenge, I went back 
to Taylor's rigid differentiation between the respect 
owed wild animals and his quasi-instrumentalist view 
of domestic animals. I discovered on second reading 
that Taylor is more insistent on vegetarianism than I 
had thought at first, "even though," he writes, "plants 
and animals are regarded as having the same inherent 
worth." 25 The principle of fairness, captured in the 
metaphor of sharing the earth, draws attention to "the 
amount of arable land needed for raising grain and other 
plants as food for those animals that are in turn to be 
eaten by humans when compared with the amount of 
land needed for raising grain and other plants for direct 
human consumption.... In order to produce one pound 
of protein for human consumption, a steer must be fed 
21 pounds of protein ... [a pig must be fed] 8.3 
pounds... [and a chicken] 5.5 pounds.,,26 The land now 
in cultivation to grow grains for cows and pigs could 
be returned to wildlife refuge. 
Taylor argues for vegetarianism by pointing out tllat 
humans have taken over much more than their fair share 
of the globe. To return land to wild animals we should 
cultivate less ground, shrink our farms' size, and 
probably concentrate them in one location so as to leave 
large tracts of wilderness. His reasoning seemed sound 
to me then, as it does now. And that is where I have 
come to rest, for the moment. There are good reasons, 
ofan environmentalist and theocentric sort, for opposing 
the eating of meat. 
I still had two questions; Would it be wrong, if we 
pulled in our plows and chemical sprays and shared the 
earth equitably with other species, to eat an occasional 
future pig raised on one of the small nonfactory farms? 
And if in that ideal world some of us revert to hunting 
and gathering as a permanent lifestyle, would it be wrong 
for us to kill and eat one of the millions of wild pigs? 
To answer this question, I went back to Taylor's five 
priority principles. When the requirements of human 
ethics compete with those of environmental ethics, 
Taylor tells us to follow principles exhibiting the attitude 
of respect for nature. The fundamental criterion is 
fairness, read as species-impartiality. According to 
Taylor, both plants and animals deserve respect, even 
though neither one is a primary moral rights-holder. The 
first priority principle is the principle of self-defense. 
It is permissible for moral agents to protect 
themselves against dangerous or harmful 
organisms by destroying them. 
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This principle "condones killing the attacker only if that 
is the only way to protect the self." We must "choose 
means that will do the least possible harm."27 
The second principle is the principle of proportion-
ality, and it deals with conflicts "between basic interests 
[for example, food, water, and continued existence] of 
animals/plants and nonbasic interests [for example, air-
conditioned offices] of humans." 
Greater weight is to be given to basic than to 
nonbasic interests, no matter what species, 
human or other, the competing claims arise 
from. Nonbasic interests are prohibited from 
overriding basic interests.28 
This principle prohibits such practices as 
• Slaughtering elephants so the ivory of their tusks 
can be used to carve items for the tourist trade. 
• Killing rhinoceros so that their horns can be used 
as dagger handles. 
• Hunting and killing rare wild mammals, such as 
leopards and jaguars, for the luxury fur trade. 
• All sport hunting and recreational fishing.29 
The third principle is the principle of minimum 
wrong. Like the second principle, it concerns conflicts 
"between basic interests ofanimals/plants and nonbasic 
interests of humans." 
The actions of humans must be such that no 
alternative ways ofachieving their ends would 
produce fewer wrongs to wild living things.3D 
Plants and animals and humans have equal inherent worth, 
in Taylor's estimation, but he recognizes that rational 
people may decide to engage in activities involving harm 
to wild living things. As long as these people are "raticnal, 
informed, and autonomous persons who have adopted 
the attitude ofrespect for nature," then "it is permissible 
for them to pursue [their] values only so long as doing so 
involves fewer wrongs (violations of duties) than any 
alternative way of pursuing those values"31 
Taylor's fourth principle is the principle of 
distributive justice, and applies to "conflicts between 
basic interests, in which nonhumans are not harming 
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us." The cases in question, then, are cases where the 
principles of self-defense, proportionality, and 
minimum wrong do not apply. 
When the interests ofparties are all basic ones 
and there exists a natural source of good that can 
be used for the benefit of any of the parties, each 
party must be allotted an equal, or fair, share.32 
The fifth principle is the principle ofrestitutive justice: 
When harm is done to humans, animals, or 
plants that are harmless, some form of 
reparation or compensation is called for. The 
greater the harm done, the greater the 
reparation required. 33 
Using theseprinciples, Iwas able toanswermy twoquestions. 
Consider the second question first. If I lived in a 
place or a time where I could not survive without 
hunting wild goats and sheep, or fishing for tuna and 
whales, then it would be permissible for me to kill and 
eat those animals. Why? Because the first principle 
enjoins self-defense and, per hypothesis, the only way 
to protect myself from death under the circumstances 
of my thought experiment would be to eat meat or fish. 
As long as I hunt and fish in a way that respects the 
principles of fairness, minimum wrong, and proportion-
ality, I will be justified in my carnivorous behavior. 
There is, Taylor sagely points out, no principle requiring 
me to sacrifice my life for the sake of animals. 
Consider now my first question, whether raising and 
slaughtering animals would not be permissible in the 
ideal world, in the world where the number of humans 
and farms is dramatically reduced. If there were, say, 
only 500 million of us instead of 5 billion, and only 
50,000 small farms instead of half a million corporate 
farms, then other species might flourish. Under those 
conditions, couldn't rational, autonomous persons who 
have adopted the principle of respect for nature decide 
to raise pigs in such a way that the animals were allowed 
maximal freedoms and long unhurried lives? And 
wouldn't it then be the case that those animals would 
be better off living that lifestyle than never having the 
opportunity to be born at all? 
This question is more difficult, but it seems to me 
we should answer it negatively. The principle of self-
defense could not be enjoined to sanction such activity, 
because slaughtering the pigs in question, even toward 
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the end of their lives, would not serve any basic interest 
ofours; we can get our protein elsewhere. The principle 
ofproportionality also offers little support, because our 
nonbasic interest in enjoying a good set of barbecued 
back ribs is prohibited from overriding the pig's basic 
interest in continued existence. The principle of 
minimum wrong would also argue against even a low 
level of meat-eating, since there are alternative ways 
of achieving our interest in experiencing robust 
gustatory pleasures. 
Careful consideration of the natural relations of all 
things and rigorous adoption of the attitude of respect 
for nature inclines strongly toward moral vegetarianism. 
And thus was I moved, against the historical practices 
of my religious tradition and my personal convictions 
about the virtues of family farms, to think some higher 
mammals have mental lives roughly analogous to ours, 
that killing them for food, even in a painless fashion, 
does harm to them, and that I should stop having bacon 
for breakfast. I then had to explain this to my 
evangelical, Iowa farm-raised mother, who did her best 
to feed her four children meat three times a day. I also 
had to explain it to my Iowa farm relatives, Mennonite 
dairy acquaintances, and Colorado ranch buddies, all 
evangelical Christians, all outfitted with Bible verses 
describing God's permission to eat meat in Genesis, 
and Jesus' story of the prodigal son ending with the 
killing of the fattened calf and-well, you fill in the 
blank. I have, as I have admitted, no definitive response 
to what I perceive as the most convincing interpretation 
of what the biblical authors thought about this matter, and 
I have conceded the Bible for the present. But I hasten 
to add that I am not happy about this situation, because 
the text has authority for me and my community, and I 
am not prepared simply to abandon it. 
6. Three Theological Arguments for Meat-Eating 
In conclusion, I want to say something against three 
theological arguments for meat-eating. The first is that 
meat-eating is a concession to sin, and God granted us 
permission to eat animals because of our fallen 
condition. The idea here is that we could not reasonably 
be expected to control our carnivorous instincts once 
our taste buds had been debased and we had been 
exposed to the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. 
So God no longer required truly moral behavior of US."34 
This argument is not convincing, for two reasons. 
First, we know from experience lhat humans are capable 
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of controlling the instinct to eat flesh. Many former 
meat-eaters have changed their habits, difficult as itmay 
have been to overcome the fear they would not find 
anything sufficiently full of protein to eat at the next 
meal. Second, if God really thought the Fall had so 
weakened us that God had henceforth to permit certain 
acts as a concession to our pitiful condition, wouldn't a 
merciful God decide to permit something less violent 
than bloodletting? How about allowing us not to respect 
our parents occasionally, or not keeping every fourth 
Sabbath, or gossiping during the cold month of 
February? These would seem more reasonable 
concessions to sin than allowing us to slit the throats of 
billions of God's good animals. 
The second argument for meat-eating follows on the 
heels of Midgley's view that the domestication of 
animals is a mutual covenant evolved between us and 
animals. The idea here is that animals do not simply 
serve us; we have a contract to provide them with food, 
water, shelter, care, and comfortable lives. But what is 
their responsibility? To pay us back with their lives. 
The contract seems a bit one-sided. The argument would 
make more sense if it was generally understood to mean 
"Let the animals live in their natural social groupings, 
provide them with conditions under which they can 
pursue their interests, and let them live until a ripe old 
age before backing up the truck." But that is not the 
way the alleged covenant is generally understood. We 
squeeze hogs together into pens not large enough for 
them to establish their own area for defecating, we throw 
them together into new social groupings every few 
weeks, we control their reproductive cycles with 
manufactured drugs, and we kill them before they are 
six months old. If the tenus of the agreement were to 
support hogs into comfortable retirement and then take 
the carcasses of animals dying of natural causes for 
sausage, the covenant argument would be more 
persuasive. I suspect, however, that not many meat 
consumers would sign it. 
The third argument is that killing animals is 
permissible as long as we take the minimal number, 
and in a pious spirit. Native Americans kill the buffalo 
with a tragic sense for the loss of its life, and tlley kill 
only the number they need. They either eat or use the 
entire animal, and they do all of this with a humble and 
grateful spirit, demonstrating respect for the harmony 
and balances of nature. 
Isn't it permissible to kill and eat animals this way? 
My response is Taylor's response: if it is a question of 
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survival, if it comes down to the Native Americans' 
life or the buffalo's life, then the principle of self-defense 
will justify the killing. I do not know how many Native 
Americans still fall into this category, but I am confident 
few of my readers face such dire circumstances. 
I have tried to write concretely, telling you my story 
about my particular religious pieties, and my evolving 
attitude toward pigs. Philosophical considerations 
moved me to give up meat, but the environmental and 
theocentric perspective that warrants my view now is 
different from the animal rights one with which I began. 
My position is somewhat softer now, and does not 
amount to an absolute proscription against the taking 
of animal life. Yet, I regret to say, it offers little moral 
support to those farmers struggling to hold onto their 
land by raising animals to be led to slaughter. 
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